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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

S. H. BENNION,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
Case No. 18345

SHELL OIL COMPANY, a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
~d

UTAH STATE BOARD OF OIL,
GAS & MINING,
Defendant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts in appellee's Brief is misleading
and ignores certain crucial facts.
A.

Mr. Bennion's Status as a Nonconsenting Owner.

At the time that the drilling unit was formed, most of
the proposed 7 working interest owners in the unit were major oil
companies.

(Shell Ex. 7 Operator's Agreement, pp. 12-13)

There

were also 54 other interest owners in the unit that did not pay
any production costs.

(Shell Ex. 7 Oil Division Order)

Although

it may have been more convenient for Shell if Mr. Bennion became

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a working interest owner at Shell's invitation, there was no
legal obligation imposed upon Mr. Bennion to consent to become a
working interest owner or to directly pay any production costs.
There was also
agreement.

no legal requirement that he sign an operator's

He eventually was treated similarly as the other 54

interest owners in the unit who also did not risk their capital
for the drilling of the well.
Prior to drilling, Section 1 had been unitized by the
Utah Board of Oil, Gas & Mining.

There was no legal necessity

for Mr. Bennion to consent because upon entry of the spacing
order Mr. Bennion became entitled by law to a landowner's royalty
and to receive his proportionate share of the production from the
unit after deducting his proportionate share of the costs of
drilling the well and paying his proportionate share of the
expense of producing any oil and gas. 1

Shell fails to enlighten

this Court in its Statement of Facts that at no time did Mr.
Bennion have any legal requirement imposed upon him to consent to
be a working interest owner or to sign any operator's agreement
with Shell.

It also fails to mention Shell's Ex. 6, which is a

letter to Mr. Bennion's attorney dated February 3, 1975, wherein
Shell recognized Mr. Bennion's entitlements.

(Shell Ex. 6)

1 Section 40-6-6(g), prior to the 1977 amendments, expressly
provides that Mr. Bennion, as a nonconsenting owner, was
entitled to a basic landowner's 1/8th royalty and his
proportionate share of production.

- 2 -
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B.

Mr. Bennion's Tender of Costs.

Appellee states in its Statement of Facts that Mr.
Bennion tendered payment to Shell of his alleged share of expenditures, but the payment was conditioned upon Shell's agreement
that his share in the unit was greater than Shell believed to be
the case.

While it is true that Mr. Bennion in tendering Shell

the sum of $26,293.87 in a check dated December 15, 1975, computed this amount based upon an incorrect percentage, it is also
true that the amount of money tendered to Shell for his share of
the costs was in excess of what Shell claimed was his obligation.
Moreover, Mr. Bennion' s computat.ion of his interest is consistent
with Shell's own computation contained in its Division Order sent
to Mr. Bennion on February 11, 1975.

(Shell's Ex. 7)

It is also

consistent with the Board's Order unitizing this section because
the Board's Order specifically states that each unit shall be 640
acres in size, not 678.2 acres which is the actual size of
Section 1.

(Appendix No. 4 to Appellant's Brief)

Shell used the

actual size of Section 1 in computing the percentage of Mr.
Bennion's interests and all of the other interest owners in the
unit, and Mr. Bennion used 640 acres, the usual size of a section.
Moreover, Shell never offered to accept Mr. Bennion's
tender of costs based upon the amount of Mr. Bennion's interest
that the parties agreed upon and leave the remaining small
percentage difference for further negotiation or judicial

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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resolution.

Rather Shell rejected Mr. Bennion's December, 1975

tender of costs and refused to pay Mr. Bennion any production
from the well for almost seven years because it was concerned, at
that time, about a .001 per cent difference between what Mr.
Bennion reasonably calculated to be his interest, .0312500%,
based upon the Board's Spacing Order,

Shell's own Division Order

and the usual size of a section, and what Shell was claiming was
Mr. Bennion's interest, .0294898%.
C.

Shell's Refusal to Tender Mr. Bennion His Production

in Kind.
Shell claims in its Statement of Facts that an additional
reason why it refused to pay Mr. Bennion his payment in kind,
even though it knew from day one that Mr. Bennion wanted his oil
and gas in kind and knew that he had a legitimate business need
for the product, was that it did not want to reward Mr. Bennion
with increased oil prices.

There is nothing in the record below

to substantiate this claim on the part of Shell and therefore
such a statement is merely after the fact conjecture supplied by
Shell's counsel.

Moreover, such a statement is directly contrary

and logically inconsistent with the fact that Shell knew from the
very beginning that Mr. Bennion wanted his product in kind.

It

cannot now claim that it withheld product from Mr. Bennion
because it did not want him to receive the benefit of increased
oil prices, when at the very beginning when Shell knew that Mr.
Bennion wanted his product and refused to provide it to him, he

- 4 -
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clearly would not have been benefiting from any increased oil
prices if the production in kind at that time was tendered to him
as he had requested.

Mr. Gallion, Shell's counsel, doesn't even

mention any concern of increased oil prices in his August 25,
1977 letter (Exhibit A-6).
The fact of increased oil prices and whether or not Mr.
Bennion would eventually benefit from them was caused as a direct
result of Shell's failure to provide Mr. Bennion with his product
in kind evidently because there was a thousandths of a per cent
difference between Mr. Bennion and Shell.

Shell now contends

illogically that it did not want Mr. Bennion to receive unfairly
the benefit of increased oil prices when quite obviously this
reason would have nothing to do with why Shell did not provide
Mr. Bennion with his product in kind at the outset, and continuing thereafter, at a time when Mr. Bennion would not have benefitted from any price increases.
D.

Mr. Bennion's Receipt of Accounting Information.

It was only after the July 26, 1979 Board hearing that
Mr. Bennion received any meaningful accounting information from
Shell.

Prior to this time he had received an audit done by

Tenneco, but the audit covered only the period from January, 1973
through December, 1974.
letter to Stirba.)

(See pg. 5, July 9, 1980 Accountant

Obviously, since the unit well started to

produce in July, 1974, the Tenneco audit was of little use to Mr.
Bennion since it only covered the initial operation of the well.
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The only other information he has received prior to this time was
a two-page worksheet which is annexed to Shell's Exhibit 18.
In other words, prior to going before the Board pursuant
to the Amended Application, Mr. Bennion had received absolutely
no itemized expenditure information for the years 1975, 1976,
1977, 1978, and 1979.

He had also received no production infor-

mation prior to July, 1977, and thereafter he received no additional production information until after the July, 1979 Board
hearing.

~

After the July, 1979 hearing Shell provided to Mr.

Bennion's counsel additional accounting information.
through A-12, Shell Ex. 23)

(Ex. A-8

The handwritten sheets provided by

Shell contain numerous errors and internal inconsistencies and
are not internally consistent in reporting the volume of gas and
oil produced from the well.
It was in response to these facts and the fact that
Shell's state reports did not conform with the production figures
reported to Mr. Bennion in its worksheet submitted to Mr.
Bennion's accountant in September, 1977 that the Board entered

....
.~

its Order allowing Mr. Bennion to audit Shell's books and records
in Houston, Texas at Shell's expense.

Mr. Bennion had already

:~

been given three different sets of figures and the Board's Order
~:

was justified.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT MAY REVIEW ALL QUESTIONS OF LAW RAISED BY THIS
APPEAL AND SUBSTITUTE ITS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE
BOARD ON MATTERS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
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As noted by Defendant-Respondent, this appeal raises
important issues of first impression in the state of Utah regarding the proper construction of Utah's Oil and Gas Conservation
Act.

Specifically, the appeal calls into question the interpre-

tation of the Act's use of the term "production" and the correct
method of computing royalty and working interests under the Act.
Also, other questions of law arising out of the relationship
between the unit operator of an oil and gas well and a nonconsenting working interest owner, as defined by the Act, are
presented by this appeal.
In its Brief, Shell attempts to limit this Court's powers
by coaxing it to accept as the proper standard of review one
which would allow the Court to set aside a Board decision only on
a finding that the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously.

Such

a limitation on the scope of review in this case is a serious
misapprehension of basic principles in the field of administrative law.

A judicial tribunal is always empowered to review

determinations of law made by administrative bodies such as the
Board of Oil, Gas & Mining.

And when the Board or other body is

found to have acted improperly the Court is free to substitute
its own judgment for the judgment of the Board.

See Packard

Motor Car Company v. N.L.R.B., 330 U. S. 485 (1947).
There are times when the legislature precludes by statute
any judicial review, or limits the scope of judicial review by
giving the administrative tribunal greater authority in certain
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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areas of its expertise.

It can be argued that legislative

silence concerning judicial review should be taken to mean courts
must pay more deference to the administrative determinations.
But none of these legislative considerations are present in this
Court's review of the Board's decision.

The applicable section

of the Act governing judicial appeal of Board action is Section
40-6-lO(b) which expressly provides that:
An action or appeal involving any provision of
this act, or a rule, regulation, or order shall be
determined as expeditiously as feasible. The trial
court shall determine the issues on both questions
of law and fact and shall affirm or set aside such
rule, regulation or order or remand the cause to the
commission for further proceedings. Such court is
hereby authorized to enjoin permanently the enforcement by the commission of this act, or any part
thereof, or any act done or threatened thereunder,
if the plaintiff shall show that as to him the act
or conduct complained of is unreasonable, unjust,
arbitrary or capricious, or violates any constitutional right of the plaintiff, or if the plaintiff
shows that the act complained of does not constitute
or result in waste, or does not in a reasonable
manner accomplish an end that is the subject matter
of this act. (Emphasis Added.)
It could not be clearer.

The statute gives to the trial

court the responsibility of determining the issues of law and
fact in any case where the appeal involves a provision of the
act, or an order of the Board.

It is precisely such an appeal

that Mr. Bennion took to the Third Judicial District Court and
now brings to this Court.

As is clearly seen from reading the

statute in its entirety, the criteria for review which the
Respondent would mistakenly have this Court follow, pertain only

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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when one is seeking injunctive relief against the Board.

This is

not the relief sought by Mr. Bennion.
Shell's misunderstanding of the appeals provision of the
Act is evident by its statement of what it calls the "review of
discretionary administrative orders."
11.)

(Respondent's Brief at

The statute, as noted conclusively above, expressly pro-

vides for the review of both questions of fact and law.

But even

if that provision were not a part of the Act, this Court would
have authority to substitute its own judgment for the Board's
when construing the meaning of the statute.

Statutory con-

struction is always considered a question of law, and so being is
left to the independent determination of the judicial tribunal to
whom the appeal is taken.
330 U.S. at 491 (1947).

Packard Motor Car Company v. N.L.R.B.,
This is especially true where, as is the

case here, its administrative body is composed principally of
non-lawyers.
This Court has recognized the principle that courts
always must exercise their judicial prerogative and decide
questions of law.

For example, in Utah Hotel Company v. Indus-

trial Commission, 151 P.2d 467 (Utah 1944), the Supreme Court
held that questions of law must always be determined in the first
instance by a court of law; otherwise, the determination could
not carry the force of law.

In that case, the Utah Hotel Company

brought suit against the Industrial Commission to review a
commission order which held the Hotel Company liable for unpaid
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taxes on all members of interstate orchestras.

The court stated

that the Industrial Commission had authority to interpret the
Employment Security Act as necessary, but that such interpretations were not binding on the courts.

Final decisions, on

matters of law, are binding only when made by an appropriate
judicial tribunal:
A "decision" or "finding" by an administrative
agency upon a judicial question is never a binding
decision, for under the doctrines of supremacy of
law and a separation of powers a binding decision
of a question of law affecting private rights may
only be made by an·appropriate court acting judicially. Id. at 470. (Emphasis added.)
The cases cited by.Shell do not support its arguments.
In not one of those cases is there a statute which resembles the
language in §40-6-lO(b).

Language from one of the opinions

quoted by Shell in its Brief is illustrative of Shell's misunderstanding of the law of judicial review under 'the circumstances of
this case:
. the well-established rule is that the courts
indulge [the administrative tribunal] considerable
latitude in determinations he makes on questions of
fact and also in the exercise of his discretion
with respect to the responsibilities which the law
imposes on him . . . . Respondent's Brief at 11
(quoting from Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimhall,
28 Utah 2d 14, 18, 497 P.2d 638, 641 (1972).
(Emphasis added)
Thus, even the cases relied upon by Shell do not leave
questions of law to the discretion of the Board.

In the original

appeal to the Third Judicial District the parties stipulated that
there existed no genuine issues as to any material fact.
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Judgment and Order of Dismissal at 21.
the language of

§

But even if there were,

40-6-lO(b) is unequivocal.

decide both questions of law and fact.

The court shall

See also Withers v.

Golding, 111 P.2d 550 (Utah 1941).
II.

MR. BENNION'S
TION FROM THE
SPACING ORDER
BE AWARDED IN

PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTEWl-lBS WELL VESTED AT THE TIME OF THE
AND HIS RIGHTFUL SHARE OF PRODUCTION SHOULD
KIND FROM THE ENTRY OF THAT ORDER.

In its Brief, Shell makes two basic arguments against Mr.
Bennion's right to receive his proportionate share of oil and gas
in kind:
(1)

That the law of capture prevails until the entry of

the pooling order and, therefore, Mr. Bennion has no statutory or
common law right to any production--in cash or in kind--until the
date of that order, and
(2)

That it would be grossly unfair for Mr. Bennion to

receive his proportionate share in kind.

Neither argument

adequately addresses the legal issues framed by this appeal, nor
do they satisfy the significant circumstances presented in this
case.

A.

ate Share o

Production Prior to the Foo

ortionOrder.

Shell's first argument that the law of capture operates
to deny Mr. Bennion any rights at all in his private property
prior to the entry of a pooling order ignores the impact of
Utah's Oil and Gas Conservation Act on the common law.

Both the

. Board and the trial court recognized that under Utah's Oil & Gas
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Conservation Act a nonconsenting owner such as Mr. Bennion has a
right to production which vests prior to the date of the pooling
order.

In an earlier case, In re Bennion, Cause No. 139-18, the

Board stated:
With respect to the applicant's rights under
§40-6-6(h), U.C.A., the Board must again first
address the issue of jurisdiction. The Board
rejects the narrow construction of 40-6-6(h),
U.C.A., presented by Gulf Oil Company. Gulf
maintains that this becomes viable only upon the
filing of a petition for relief under the provision, thus precluding the Board from requiring
Gulf to pay the applicant a landowner's royalty of
1/8th from the date of first production from the
subject well. However, the Board construes
§40-6-6(h), U.C.A., as a statutory rendition of the
rights of non-consenting working interest owners.
The statute allows the nonconsenting owner
certain property rights which become effective when
oil is produced upon a drilling unit. While the
petitioner may request the Board to enforce those
rights, they do not lie dormant until triggered by
a petition. (Emphasis Added.)
This position taken by the Board and the trial court is
in accordance with the weight of case law and scholarship on the
issue.

See Appellant's Brief at 11-19 and authorities cited

therein.
Furthermore, Shell completely ignores the fact that the
Spacing Order entered by the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining in
Cause No. 139-8 on September 20, 1972, expressly precluded Mr.
Bennion, or anyone other than Shell, from drilling a well in the
section covered by the Spacing Order.

In other words, from the

moment of that Order giving Shell the exclusive right to drill,
Mr. Bennion and all other mineral interest owners in the section
- 12 -
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were denied the right to capture any oil and gas under their
property and exercise the usual rights of ownership thereon.

The

logical quid pro quo of that denial of property rights is to
guarantee that for the lost right to capture and sell the oil and
gas, the individual owner will receive the right to a share of
the production itself--which is precisely what the Utah Act
provides.
That being the case, there is little logic in Shell's
argument that Mr. Bennion had no right to production, even though
his property was being drained, and he was being precluded from
drilling his own well, unless and until he filed an application
with the Board.

If this Court refused to follow both the Board

the the Court below in holding that the Pooling Order is retroactive to the date of first production, it would in effect take Mr.
Bennion's property and give it to the Respondent without any
offsetting compensation, and find no constitutional infirmity in
so doing.

Such a conclusion is untenable.

Not only would it

violate our constitutional guarantees on both state and federal
levels, it would, in any context, be absurd.

Yet it is just such

a result that the Respondent argues for.
Moreover, the efforts expended by Shell in its brief on
the basic question of retroactivity indicate that Shell either
perceives but dimly the true issue on appeal or that it wants to
camouflage the real

issu~

outdated law of capture.

by drawing the Court's attention to the
As mentioned earlier in this Brief,
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both the Board and the trial court recognized that Mr. Bennion's
royalty interest and working interest operated retroactively to
the date of first production, because it occurred after the entry
of the Spacing Order.

In fact, Shell does not appeal that

determination; but makes an argument against it in its brief only
to set up the self-serving statement that Shell attempted to
voluntarily pay Mr. Bennion a share of proceeds from first
production, having no legal obligation to do so.

See Respon-

dent's Brief at 16.
The true issue which this Court must determine is whether
Mr. Bennion's recognized share of production can be demanded in
kind.

It is inconsistent for the Board and the trial court to

recognize the right to payment of a nonconsenting owner's interest in kind as existing under the Act but not retroactively when,
indeed, his interests to proceeds are enforced retroactively.
There is no logical nor legal basis for drawing such a distinction between interests prior to pooling and interests subsequent.

The statute certainly lends no support for such an

arbitrary distinction:
. . . as to each owner who does not agree, he shall
be entitled to receive from the person or persons
drilling and operating the well on the unit his
share of the production applicable to his interest.
Utah Code Anno. § 40-6-6(g) (prior to 1977
amendments.)
In his treatise, Kulp defines "royalty" in the context of
an oil and gas lease as:
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A share of the product or proceeds therefrom
reserved to the lessor as a part of the considerati?n for execution of the lease. Kulp, Oil and
Gas Rights, Topic 6 § 10.36 (1954).
A common provision in many leases is to allow the mineral interest lessor the right to receive production in kind.

Apparently,

the Board and the trial court treated Mr. Bennion as a forced
lessor and gave him the right of a lessor to demand production in
kind.

That right should be co-extensive with the right as a

forced lessor to share proportionately in production of the well
from the date of its first production.

Any other interpretation

of Mr. Bennion's rights would put him on a less

fa~ored,

discrim-

inatory status vis a vis the other mineral interest owners, a
result which the intent of the Act cannot tolerate.
B.

Retroactive Payment of Mr. Bennion's Share of
Production In Kind Is Just and Fair Under the
Circumstances.

Shell's other argument, that it would be grossly unfair
for Mr. Bennion to receive his product in kind, considering the
dramatic movement in oil prices during recent years, is both
specious and unfounded.

Shell contends that Mr. Bennion was

dilatory in making his demand for production in kind and in
pursuing a pooling order; therefore, awarding him the relief he
seeks would defeat the purposes of the Act.

By so contending,

Shell would have this Court see Mr. Bennion as a scheming one who
purposefully orchestrated the delay of Shell's payment to coincide with the course of world oil prices, of which Mr. Bennion is
imagined somehow to have had a prophetic foreknowledge.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Such a picture does not fit into the facts as contained
in the record on appeal.

The reality is that Mr. Bennion put

Shell on notice of his demands in a timely fashion, and that Mr.
Bennion timely filed for relief with the Board.

Specifically,

Mr. Bennion notified Shell in 1973 that he wanted production in
kind, well before the time of his application with the Board in
1975.

Thereafter, Mr. Bennion repeatedly attempted to negotiate

with Shell concerning his entitlement to receive production in
kind.
The plain truth of the matter is that Shell was the
dilatory party in this dispute.

Shell tries to get much mileage

from its offers to pay Mr. Bennion a percentage of proceeds from
the production which occurred between the Spacing and Pooling
Orders.

But Mr. Bennion exercised his right to demand payment in

kind, which Shell refused to make at a time well before the rise
in oil prices.

Had Shell not been guilty of wrongfully withhold-

ing such payment, and had paid production in kind as the oil or
gas was produced, there would be no element of "windfall" present
in this suit.

Furthermore, all considerations of payment in kind

aside, Shell made no payments of cash until ordered to by the
Board of Oil, Gas & Mining.
A similar situation occurred in Wood Oil Co. v. Corporation Corrnnission (Wood #2), 239 P.2d 1023 (Okla. 1950).

In that

case, the mineral interest owner (Toklan) delayed for a time
before asserting his rights to a share of production.

- 16 -

The unit

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

operator (Wood Oil), on the other hand delayed in making payments
of shares to Toklan, but nevertheless raised Toklan's delay as
grounds for estopping its assertion of a share in production.
The court held:
With the entry of the [spacing] order of April 1,
1947, the right of Toklan to participate in the
production arose as a matter of law and Wood Oil,
. . . cannot properly ask to profit by the laxity
of another which, at worst, is but comparable to
its own. Id. at 1027.
Furthermore, Shell's argument that an award of payment of
production in kind prior to the pooling order would be unfair
fails to take into consideration the fact that Shell could have
noticed up for hearing Mr. Bennion's involuntary pooling application if it had so desired.

Instead Shell chose to wait and see

if it could persuade Mr. Bennion to sign the pooling agreement
and fit neatly into Shell's desired program of operation.

Shell

should not now be allowed to impose a standard on Mr. Bennion
which Shell itself has not met.
If one of the purposes of the Act is to provide involuntary pooling where a drilling unit cannot be voluntarily pooled,
it is just as feasible for the operator of that drilling unit to
pursue such an application with the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining,
as it is with a royalty interest owner.

This feature is espe-

cially important in view of the fact that in most instances the
operator, with its legal sophistication in oil and gas matters,
will be in a better position to avail itself of statutory
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remedies provided by the Act than the individual mineral interest
owner.
Furthermore, the true inequity in the present dispute is
that Mr. Bennion had to wait almost seven years, even after Shell
was fully aware of his claims, to receive his royalties.

Ger-

tainly if any one was dilatory, it was Shell and not Mr. Bennion.
Shell ignored Mr. Bennion's repeated requests for his oil and gas
in kind, and only after being ordered by a state agency, did it
pay Mr. Bennion an amount "purportedly" due him.

Shell's con-

tention that it did this "voluntarily" is completely specious, as
a reading of the record reveals.
III.

MR. BENNION IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SINCE HIS
RIGHT TO RECEIVE ROYALTIES EXISTED FROM THE DATE OF THE
WELL'S FIRST PRODUCTION.
It is unquestionable that if Mr. Bennion was not entitled

to receive any royalties prior to the date of the Board's Interim
Order, he would not be entitled to any prejudgment interest.
Obviously, prejudgment interest does not accrue until such time
an obligation or an indebtedness exists.

Shell argues that since

no debt existed prior to the time of the Board's order, it now
has no obligation for prejudgment interest.

Such an argument is

not only fallacious., but also completely contrary to the position
taken by the Board in entering the Order from which this appeal
is taken.
Not only did the Board decide that Mr. Bennion was
entitled to receive production in cash from the date of the

- 18 -
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well's first production, but it also awarded Mr. Bennion six per
cent interest, or $2,554.06 on his royalty interest from the date
of first production through May 6, 1980.

It is not clear why the

Board chose not to award Mr. Bennion interest on his working
interest as well.

However, it is only logical that if he is

entitled to receive interest on his royalty interest, he also is
entitled to receive interest on his working interest as well.
Both royalty obligations were withheld from Mr. Bennion when due
and payable to him, and therefore Shell is obligated for interest
on the amount of each royalty from the date it was due and
payable through May 6, 1980.
CONCLUSION
Fundamentally, this case is one of property rights in gas
and oil produced by TEWl-lBS Well.

Shell's arguments fail to

address the basic fact that the assets produced by Shell belong
in part to Mr. Bennion.

The Oil and Gas Conservation Act does

more than conserve our energy resources; it serves another
purpose of safeguarding the private property rights of an individual mineral interest owner as guaranteed by our state and
federal constitutions.

In accordance with those guarantees, and

in the interest of fairness, Appellant respectfully prays this
Court to grant Mr. Bennion his proportionate share of oil and gas
in kind from the time of first production.
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